

REPORT INFORMATION

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY	USSR/Satellites	REPORT	
SUBJECT	1. Soviet-Satellite Relationships 2. Dissolution of the Cominform 3. Internal Policies of the Soviet Union	DATE DISTR.	2 NOV 68
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This is UNEVALUATED Information

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

1. [redacted] during the Soviet-Yugoslav meetings in Belgrade, Khrushchev, in order to attract Tito back into the Soviet fold, might have given the latter assurance of ultimate control over Albania. Tito is interested in extending his sphere of influence by the creation of a Balkan Federation, but the Soviets will not permit this unless they are confident that they have regained Tito's complete loyalty. 25X1
2. [redacted] the Soviets might loosen control of the Satellites in conformity with their current peace offensive [redacted] the Soviets would do so unless they were compelled to by internal political weaknesses. The return of the joint stock companies to the Satellites is merely a token gesture by the Soviets, with little or no significance as a genuine concession or moderation of control. Recent replacements of career Soviet diplomats in the Satellites by Party officials are an attempt to tighten control of Party ideologies in those countries, the new incumbents probably having been installed at Khrushchev's direction. 25X1
3. Regarding the relationship between ambassadors and security advisors in Satellite countries [redacted] in 1950 Moscow promulgated a directive to the effect that the MGB representative should confine himself to his advisory functions and the collection of information, and not attempt to direct or to appear to issue orders. [redacted] 25X1
4. [redacted] the Soviets are intending to disband the Cominform, in an attempt to convince the world of the seriousness of their desires for peace and neutrality, [redacted] such rumors would never be confirmed. In response to the suggestion [redacted] 25X1

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that the Cominform might be disbanded in name only and then continue to function under some other structure, such as the Warsaw Pact, [ ] the efficacy of the Cominform lay in its ability to coordinate the Party line within all countries of the world both within and outside the Soviet orbit. A mechanism set up under the Warsaw Pact would be effective only for the USSR and her Satellites. [ ] a change in the name of the Cominform would accomplish little, since, regardless of name, the organization by nature of its function would be readily exposed for what it was. The alternative, to disband the Cominform, in name and in fact, would be unrealistic from the Soviet point of view.

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5. [ ] the amnesty granted on 17 September 1955 to prisoners in the Soviet Union was merely a propaganda move, designed to impress the population within the Union with the new, benevolent attitude of the Government and to persuade the Soviet emigres abroad to return. The amnesty would have little substantive effect, since the large group sentenced during the period 1944 to 1947 would have completed, or nearly completed, ten-year sentences without benefit of amnesty, while those released from 20-year terms will, in effect, remain under the direct control of the MVD by being forced to remain in Siberia, contrary to the amnesty's declaration that they will receive all the rights of a normal citizen.
6. Changes in the immediate future in the KGB organs in the republics are possible although unlikely. Having already placed his own men in key positions at the KGB Center, Khrushchev will probably wait until the conclusion of the 20th Party Congress before making corresponding replacements in the republics, in order to minimize the impression of conflict within the Government. After the 20th Party Congress, if there is no diminution of Khrushchev's authority, changes in the republics are to be expected.
7. Normally, the First Secretary of a republic Communist Party is the key figure in the republic, and, in the case of an irreconcilable conflict between himself and the local KGB representative, he could have the latter replaced. Key appointments to the local KGB organs are first discussed with the First Secretary, and the candidates are withdrawn if he objects. However, if Khrushchev has a personal interest in the appointment, it could be made over the First Secretary's objections. The heads of the KGB in the republics are now trying to ingratiate themselves with the First Secretaries in anticipation of the forthcoming mass replacements.

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